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NOTES
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE -PSYCHOTHERAPIST'S
LIABILITY TO THIRD PERSONS FOR VIOLENT ACTS OF
PATIENT
I. INTRODUCTION
Until recently the psychiatrist or psychotherapist 1 has enjoyed
freedom from any type of malpractice litigation. Malpractice
litigation was slower to develop in the field of psychiatry than other
professional fields for at least two reasons. First, the courts
recognize that there are a wide variety of acceptable therapeutic
techniques for similar situations in psychotherapy. 2 Because of this
diversity of techniques and the rapidly changing trends in
techniques used the courts have been reluctant to establish definite
legal standards of care. 3 Second, in the hazy area of mental illness it
is difficult to show that a particular act or omission of the therapist
"proximately caused" injury to the plaintiff.
4
Even though the above hindrances to malpractice litigation
exist, there has been a booming increase in lawsuits involving
therapists. 5 The great bulk of malpractice suits against therapists
are brought by patients, but there are an increasing number of
cases brought by persons not being treated. 6 Most of these involve
attempts to collect damages from the therapist for harm caused by
the patient to third persons.
Therapists can not overlook potential liability to third persons
1. In BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1392 (4th ed. 1968), psychotherapy is defined as
[A]method or system of alleviating or curing certain forms of disease, particularly
diseases of the nervous system or such as are traceable to nervous disorders, by
suggestion, persuasion, encouragement, the inspiration of hope or confidence, the
discouragement of morbid memories, associations, or beliefs, and other similar means
addressed to the mental state of the patient, without (or sometimes in conjunction
with) the administration of drugs or other physical remedies.
The only professionals who may hold themselves out as "psychotherapists" are medical doctors
and Ph. D. clinical psychologists. However, psychotherapeutic techniques may be used by other
professionals. See Note, Tort Liability of the Psychotherapist, 8 U. S. F. L. REV. 405, 435-36 (1973).
2. Rothblatt & Leroy, Avoiding Psychiatric Malpractice, 9 CAL. W. L. REV. 260 (1973).
3. See Note, Medical Malpractice: The Liability of Psychiatrists, 48 NOTRE DAME LAW. 693, 697
(1973).
4. See Rothblatt & Leroy, supra note 2, at 260. "Because the whole psychotherapeutic process is
so nebulous, it is very difficult to fix responsibility in a meaningful way. Until more is known about
the workings of the human mind and the effect of psychotherapy on the psyche, proving causation
will remain a major impediment." Note, Tort Liability of the Psychotherapist, 8 U. S. F. L. REv. 405,
435-36 (1973).
5. Slawson, Psychiatric Malpractice: A Re4 ional Incidence Study, 126 AM. J. PsYcH. 1302, 1303
(1970).
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since they frequently deal with emotionally disturbed patients who
can be dangerous to particular persons or to society in general.
Because the therapist can be caught in the middle-he has a duty to
care for the patient and probably has a duty to protect potential
victims from violent acts by the patient, certain questions arise.
How does the therapist balance his duty of confidentiality to the
patient with the duty to protect third persons? For example, what
should a therapist do if the patient reveals an intention to harm or
possibly kill a third person?
The purposes of this note are as follows: first, to acquaint the
reader with the general development of third party liability;
second, to highlight the therapist's conflicting duties to his patient
and to the public; and third, to examine the existing standard of
care, point out its deficiencies, and suggest possible improvements.
II. TARASOFF V. REGENTS OF UNIVERSITY OF
CALIFORNIA7
The so called "therapist's dilemma" was the subject of a
recent California case which extended a therapist's duty to a third
person and has caused considerable controversy. A number of legal
articles have been written closely analyzing the holding.8
The case involved a young man, Prosenjit Poddar, from India
who was a student at the University of California-Berkeley. On
October 27, 1969, Poddar shot and killed Tatiana Tarasoff, a
young woman who. had rejected his love. 9
Two months before the murder Poddar had sought psychiatric
help at the student health facility at his college. 10 The psychiatrist
who first saw Poddar referred him to a psychologist for
psychotherapy. The psychologist found Poddar to be dangerous
based on Poddar's pathological attachment to Tatiana Tarasoff and
on evidence that he intended to purchase a gun. The psychologist
requested the campus police to take Poddar to a mental hospital for
b. "A review of materials presented at meetings, conferences, seminars, and in literature reveals
that there is a total preoccupation with the physician's liability to the patient with little thought given
to his potential liability to third parties." Hirsh, Physician's Potential Liability to Third Parties, 22 MED.
TR.T. Q. 145(1975).
7. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P. 2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14(1976).
8. Ayres. & Holbrook. Law. Pisichotheropc and the Duty to IVarn: A Tragic Trilogy?. 27 BAYLOR L.
REV. 677 (1975): Fleming & Maximov, The Patient or His Victin, The Therapist's Dilemma. 62 CA.. L
REV. 1025 (1974): Slovenko. Psychotherapy and Confidentiality, 24 CLEv. ST. L. REV. 375 (1975): Stone,
The Tarasoff Decisions: Suing Psychotherapists to SafeguardSoety, 90 HARV. L. REV. 358 (1976); 53 N. D.
L. RE\-. 279(1976): 22 N. Y. L. S. L. REV. 1011 (1977): 6 SETON HX L L. REV. 536 (1975).
9. Tarasoffv. Regents of Univ. ofCal.. 17 Cal. 3d 425. 430. 551 P. 2d 334, 339. 131 Cal. Rptr.
14. 19(1976).
10. Id. at 432, 551 P.2d at 341, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 21.
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observation. The police officers went to Poddar's home and
interviewed him at length, but concluded that he was rational and
not dangerous so they did not escort him to a mental hospital.'1
Poddar had promised the police that he would stay away from Miss
Tarasoff. The director of the Psychiatric Department ordered that
no further action be taken to commit Poddar. 12 At the time of the
therapy Miss Tarasoff was out of the country, but when she
returned Poddar went to her home and killed her.
Miss Tarasoff's parents sued the therapists, the campus
policemen, and their employer, the Regents of the University of
California. 3 The parents argued that the defendants had a duty to
warn Miss Tarasoff or her family of the danger, and that they also
had a duty to bring about Poddar's confinement under the
California Civil Commitment Statute. 
14
The lower court held for the therapists stating that there was
no duty running to third persons. 15 Moreover, the court said it was
not shown that the failure to act was the proximate cause of the
death inasmuch as the patient could have done the same thing even
if he had been hospitalized. 16
The Supreme Court of California reversed, holding that the
relationship between a therapist and patient imposes on the
therapist a duty to use reasonable care to protect third persons
against danger posed by the patient. 17 Depending on the
circumstances, the duty of the therapist may call for the therapist to
warn the intended victim or others who could convey the message
to the potential victim, or to notify the police, or to take any action
necessary. 18
III. DUTY TO THIRD PERSONS
A. DEVELOPMENT OF GENERAL RULES
In the Tarasoff case the therapists contended that under the
circumstances they owed no duty of care to Miss Tarasoff or her
11. Id.
12. The director also demanded that the campus police return to the hospital's office all written
communications by the hospital staff which advocated Poddar's involuntary commitment or arrest.
The director also ordered that these and other records of the therapy be destroyed. 17 Cal. 3d at 432,
551 P.2d at 341, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
13. Id. at 430, 551 P.2d at 340, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
14. Id.
15. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 33 Cal. App. 3d 275, 282, 108 Cal. Rptr. 878, 886
(1973).
16. Id. at 283, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 887.
17. 17 Cal. 3d at 431, 551 P.2d at 340, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
18. Id. at 425, 551 P.2d at 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
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parents. 1 9 Before the court could determine that the therapists were
liable it had to find a duty running to a third person and that this
duty had been violated.
As a general rule, a "defendant owes a duty of care to all
persons who are foreseeably endangered by his conduct, with
respect to all risks which make the conduct unreasonably
dangerous." 20 However, at common law this duty was somewhat
limited in that a defendant was under no duty to control the
conduct of another 21 or to warn third persons of another's possible
conduct. 22 Therefore, at common law a therapist could not be liable
for failing to warn a potential victim of a patient's intentions.
This common law rule of no duty to control or warn was later
modified by an exception creating a duty when the defendant
stands in some special relationship to either of the following: 1) the
person whose conduct needs to be controlled; or 2) the foreseeable
victim of violent conduct. 23 Today, the common law rule of no duty
to control or warn has not been rejected; to the contrary, affirmative
duties have been imposed and the list of special relationships has
been expanded which justify departure from the rule.
24
B. SPECIAL RELATIONSHIPS GENERALLY
At first the duty to warn arising out of a special relation was
limited to a parent-child 25 or master-servant relationship. 26 These
cases generally involved situations where one party was in charge of
an individual with dangerous propensities. It was an easy step from
there to extend the duty to warn and the duty to control another to
hospitals and prisons.
27
19. Id. at 433, 551 P.2d at 342, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
20. Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382, 399, 525 P.2d 669, 680, 115 Cal.
Rptr. 765, 776 (1974); Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1968).
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965).
22. Id. 314.
23. Id. § 315-20,
24. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 56 at 348-50 (4th ed. 1971). Prosser lists the following as
relationships giving rise to a duty to control the conduct of third persons: carrier to its passengers;
innkeepers to guests; employers to employees; jailor toward his prisoner; hospital toward its patients;
school toward its pupils: and, parents toward their children. Id.
There are recorded cases where a duty has been found running to a third person even where no
special relationship exists. In Hergenrether v. East. 61 Cal. 2d 440, 393 P.2d 164, 39 Cal. Rptr. 4
(1964), the owner of a stolen truck was found liable to a third person who was injured by the thief's
driving. Also, in Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971), the court
held a bartender who supplied an intoxicated customer with liquor liable to a person whom the drunk
injured on his way home.
25. Ellis v. D'Angelo. 116 Cal. App. 2d 310, 253 P.2d 675 (1953): Harper & Kime. The Duty to
Control the Conduct ofAnother, 43 N-ALE L. J. 886. 89.3-95 (1934).
26. Nalera v. Southern Pac. Co.. 191 Cal. App. 2d 634. 13 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1961): Harper &
Kime, supro note 25. at 896-97.
27.
The cases uniformly say that those charged with the care and treatment of the
hospitalized patient must exercise reasonable care to avoid opportunities for aggressive
NOTE
The liability of a prison to third persons for negligently
permitting escape of dangerous convicts has been tested in a variety
of fact situations with varying results. Cases in this area are
complicated by governmental immunity but some courts have not
hesitated to hold for third party victims.
28
As stated above, hospitals have been found liable to third
persons. In Vistica v. Presbyterian Hospital 29 the court stated that
when a "hospital has notice or knowledge of facts from which it
might reasonably be concluded that a patient would be likely to
harm himself or others unless preclusive measures were taken, then
the hospital must use reasonable care in the circumstances to
prevent such harm. "30 Several cases have found a mental hospital
liable for negligently permitting the escape or release of a
dangerous patient. In Greenberg v. Barbour 31 the court upheld a
-cause of action against a hospital staff doctor whose negligent
failure to admit a mental patient resulted in that patient assaulting
the plaintiff.
The courts have imposed on doctors a duty to protect third
persons in several situations. A doctor must warn a patient if the
patient's condition or medication renders certain conduct, such as
driving a car, dangerous to others. 32 Doctors have also been found
liable to third persons for failing to diagnose a contagious disease
33
and for failing to warn members of the family of a contagious
disease. 34 These third parties either suffered severe medical
consequences or died from these diseases after continuing close
contact with the patients. The cases in this area indicate that the
physician-patient relationship is in the category of a special
relationship which may give rise to affirmative duties.
Another instance where a party can be held liable is if the
promises to warn a third party of an event and then fails to issue the
or self-destructive conduct if they know of facts from which they could reasonably
conclude that the patient would be likely to harm himself or others in the absence of
preclusive measures.
Slovenko, Psychotherapy andConfidentiaity, 24 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 375,395 (1975).
28. Green v. State, 91 So. 2d 153 (La. 1956); Webb v. State, 91 So. 2d 156 (La. 1956).
29. 67 Cal. 2d 465, 432 P.2d 193, 62 Cal. Rptr. 577 (1967).
30. Vistica v. Presbyterian Hosp. & Med. Center, 67 Cal. 2d 465, 468, 432 P.2d 193, 196, 62
Cal. Rptr. 577, 580(1967).
31. 322 F. Supp. 745 (E. D. Pa. 1971).
32. In Kaiser v. Suburban Transp. Sys., 65 Wash. 2d 461, 398 P.2d 14 (1965), an injured
passenger sued the bus driver's doctor for the doctor's failure to warn the bus-driver-patient of the
effects of a drug. In Freese v. Lemmon, 210 N. W. 2d 576 (Iowa 1973) a pedestrian sued the doctor
for failing to advise the patient of the dangers of driving due to possible seizures. The patient drove
into the pedestrian.
33. Hofmann v. Blackmon, 241 So. 2d 752 (Fla. App. 1970) (failed to diagnose tuberculosis);
Jones v. Stanko, 118 Ohio St. 147, 160 N. E. 456 (1928) (failure to diagnose smallpox).
34. Skillings v. Allen, 143 Minn. 323, 173 N.W. 663 (1919) (failure to warn of scarlet fever);
Wojcik v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 18 Misc. 2d 740, 183 N.Y.S.2d 351 (1959) (failure to warn of
tuberculosis).
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warning. In Fair v. United States, 35 a hospital was found liable for
failing to inform the wife or detective agency responsible for her
protection of her husband's release. In a recent Eighth Circuit case,
Williams v. United States, 36 a Veteran's Hospital was held liable for
failing to notify county authorities that they were releasing a man
with known violent propensities. The hospital had previously
agreed to issue this warning before releasing the man.
C. PSYCHOTHERAPIST LIABILITY TO THIRD PERSONS
As to liability of psychotherapists to third persons there is
limited case law. In 1967, the United States District Court for the
District of North Dakota decided a case similar to the facts of the
Tarasoff case. In Merchants National Bank & Trust Co. v. United States37
a psychologist of the Veteran's Hospital in Meade, South Dakota,
was held to be negligent for failing to bring evidence of the patient's
dangerous mental condition to the attention of hospital personnel. 38
The court felt that if the psychologist had provided enough
information the hospital would not have allowed the patient to be
released to work at a local farm. When the patient was released, he
traveled from the South Dakota farm to Detroit Lakes, Minnesota,
and killed his wife.39 The Veteran's Hospital was also found liable
for the death of the patient's wife because it failed to inform the
farmer who employed the patient of the patient's background. 40
Since the farmer did not know of the patient's mental condition, he
permitted the patient to come and go freely during nonworking




In Underwood v. United States3I a military officer who had a
history of violence associated with severe mental illness was
prematurely released from a hospital and killed his wife. The
psychiatrist was held liable for the killing because he failed to pass
on information concerning threats by the patient against his wife to
a psychiatrist that took over the case.4 3 If the first psychiatrist had
35. 234 F.2d 288(5th Cir. 1956).
36. 450 F. Supp. 1040 (D.S.D. 1978). A similar decision was reached in Morgan v. County of
Yuba, 230 Cal. App. 2d 938, 41 Cal. Rptr. 508 (3d Dist. 1964), where a county was held liable for
the sheriff's failure to warn the wife of her husband's early release fromjail.
37. 272 F. Supp. 409 (D.N.D. 1967). This case was cited in the Tarasoff opinion. 17 Cal. 3d at
437. 551 P.2d at 344, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
38. Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States. 272 F. Supp. 409, 418(D.N.D. 1967).
39. Id. at 414.
40. Id. at 421.
41. Id. at 412. See 53 N.D.L. RFv. 279 (1976).
42. 356 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1966).
43. Underwood v, United States. 356 F.2d 92, 98 (5th Cir. 1966).
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not failed to pass on the information the patient apparently would
not have been released.
The North Dakota case and Underwood held a therapist liable
to a third person in much the same circumstances as the Tarasoff
case. However, these earlier decisions did not cause as much
controversy among therapists as did Tarasoff The difference.
between the earlier decisions and Tarasoff is that Tarasoff seems to
be more far-reaching and seems to have the potential to extend the
therapist's liability further. The Tarasoff opinion in effect places an
affirmative duty on the therapist to protect the public, whereas the
earlier cases were limited to a determination of the existence or
nonexistence of negligence.
The above analysis of duty to third persons seems to indicate
that the courts are expanding the duty and it is unlikely that a court
will dismiss a case against a psychotherapist merely on the ground
that there can be no duty to a third person. "The .... relevant case
law should dispel any notion that to impose on therapists a duty to
take precautions for the safety of persons threatened by a patient,
where due care so requires, is in any way opposed to contemporary
ground rules on the duty relationship." 44
IV. FACTORS WHICH DETERMINE THE EXTENT OF
THE THERAPIST'S DUTY.
If the therapist-patient relationship does give rise to a duty to
third persons, how far should this duty extend? Does the bare
establishment of a therapist-patient relationship create a duty to
care for the safety of the entire public?
At the outset, it is important to note that medical professionals
are charged with the public interest. 45 The public in general relies
on physicians for care and protection and the courts will not look
favorably on acts by a therapist which place the public safety in
obvious peril.
There are a number of factors which are considered when
deciding if a doctor has satisfied his obligation to third persons.
Some courts have looked to the degree of control over the patient to
determine the extent of liability.46 These courts have determined
that the greater degree of control over inpatients tends to extend the
44. Fleming & Maximov, The Patient or His Victim: The Therapist's Dilemma, 62 CAL. L. REv.
1025, 1030 (1974).
45. Wilmington Gen. Hosp. v. Manlove, 174 A.2d 135 (Del. 1961).
46. Fleming & Maximov, supra note 44 at 1029.
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duty in this area.47 At any rate, whether a patient is an inpatient or
an outpatient would be relevant in determining what protective
measures could reasonably be expected.4 8  This factor is not
determinative though because the existence of an outpatient
relationship does not negate the duty of the therapist to third
persons.
Another factor looked at is the extent of the doctor's
knowledge of the patient's dangerous propensities. At least one
court has required that the therapist possess actual knowledge of the
patient's dangerous tendencies before a duty to warn will arise. 49
The theory is that if the doctor has not noted any dangerous
tendencies he can not be expected to warn anyone or to control the
patient. The problem with this approach is that is is easy for the
therapist to assert he has not noted any dangerous propensities and
for this reason most courts do not require proof of actual knowledge
of dangerous tendencies by the therapist. Most courts look at the
whole relationship and determine whether or not there were any
events which should have put the therapist on notice that the
patient could commit violent acts. 50
Another factor affecting the extent of a therapist's duty is
whether or not the therapist can identify the person who is a
potential victim. Substantial medical literature suggests that a
significant number of threats of violence are made not toward
individuals who can be identified but toward groups or entities as a
whole. 51 Obviously the psychotherapist would have a more readily
definable duty to warn if the threats of harm were against a specific
person whose name is revealed.
The psychotherapist's inability to predict future violent
behavior is an important factor favoring a limited duty to third
persons. There is overwhelming evidence that therapists cannot




49. Sealey v. Finkelstein, - Misc. 2d -, 206 N.Y.S. 2d 512 (Sup. Ct. 1960). The court relied
heavily on the fact that the patient had never exhibited any dangerous or vicious propensitites prior
to the assault and, therefore, the physician could not accurately predict whether the patient would
become violent. Id. at -, 206 N.Y.S. 2d at 514.
50. Note, Tort Liability ofthe Psychotherapist, 8 U.S.F.L. REv. 405 (1973).
51. MacDonald, The Threat to Kill, 120 AM.J. PSYCH. 125(1963).
52. Diamond, The Psychiatric Prediction of Danerousness, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 439 (1975); Ennis &
Litwack. Psvchiatr' and the Presumption qf Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CAL. L. REV. 693
(1974): Rosenhan. On Being Sane in Insane Places. 13 SANTA CLARA LAW. 379. 384 (1973).
Justice Douglas has stated as follows: "Predictions ot dangerous behavior, no matter who makes
them, are incredibly inaccurate, and there is a growing consensus that psychiatrists are not uniquely
qualified to predict dangerous behavior and are, in fact, less accurate in their predictions than other
professionals." Muriel v. Baltimore City Crim. Ct., 407 U. S. 355, 364 n.2 (1972) (Douglas J.,
dissenting from a denial ofcertiorari).
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In a well-known New York study, psychiatrists
predicted that 989 persons were so dangerous that they
could not be kept even in civil mental hospitals, but would
have to be kept in maximum security hospitals run by the
Department of Corrections. Then, because of a United
States Supreme Court decision (citations omitted) those
persons were transferred to civil hospitals. After a year,
the Department of Mental Hygiene reported that one-
fifth of them had been discharged to the community, and
over half had agreed to remain as voluntary patients.
During the year, only 7 of the 989 committed or
threatened any act that was sufficiently dangerous to
require retransfer to the maximum security hospital.
Seven correct predictions out of almost a thousand is not a
very impressive record.
Other studies, and there are many, have reached the
same conclusion: psychiatrists simply cannot predict
dangerous behavior. They are wrong more often than
they are right. And they always error by overpredicting
dangerous behavior.
53
If a therapist cannot accurately predict future behavior it
follows that he cannot determine when he needs to give a warning
to a third person. It seems that the courts recognize the dilemma of
therapists in predicting conduct, but do not favor limiting the duty
to third persons merely because the therapists find it difficult to
predict the future conduct of the patients.
Hard and fast rules defining the extent of a therapist's duty to
third persons are difficult to state. A combination of factors as
stated above will be applied to the facts of each particular case. In
addition, the therapist's duty to protect a third party must also be
weighed against the conflicting duty to protect and help the patient.
V. THE THERAPIST'S CONFLICT: DUTY TO THE
PATIENT AND DUTY TO WARN.
A. CONFIDENTIALITY.
In order to have effective psychiatric treatment the patient
must be assured that all disclosures to the therapist will be
53. B. ENNIS, PRISONERS OF PSYCHIATRY: MENTAL PATIENTS, PSYCHIATRISTS, AND THE LAW 227
(1972), also cited in People v. Burnick, 14 Cal. 3d 306, 326-27, 535 P.2d 352, 365-66, 121 Cal. Rptr.
488, 501-02 (1975).
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confidential. "It is clearly recognized that the very practice of
psychiatry vitally depends upon the reputation in the community
that the psychiatrist will not tell. 54
A valid assurance of confidentiality is important for a number
of reasons. First, without such an assurance many- people who need
treatment will not seek it.55 Most people who seek psychiatric help
do not want anyone to know their disclosures, or even that they are
seeking help. 56 People who need help often are afraid to seek it for
fear of what will happen to their reputation if anyone finds out.
Society-often stigmatizes people seeking psychiatric help. Therefore
potential patients need to be assured of the utmost confidentiality.
Second, assurance of confidentiality is needed so the patient
will fully disclose his thoughts. Until a patient can trust his psychia-
trist not to violate their confidential relationship, "the unconscious
psychological control mechansim of repression will prevent the
recall of past experience. "5 Most therapists agree that the patient
approaches treatment with both conscious and unconscious-
inhibitions against revealing his innermost thoughts. 58 The-
assurance of confidentiality can break down these inhibitions and
help produce full disclosure. Full disclosure is helpful in that it helps
both the patient and therapist to recognize the patient's problems.
Third, confidentiality helps to maintain and build trust in the
therapist. Trust appears to be the foundation of successful-
treatment. A noted authority has stated as follows: "All authorities
appear to agree that if the trust relationship cannot be developed
because of collusive communication between the psychiatrist and
others, treatment will be frustrated. ,159
B. CONFIDENTIALITY AND CONFLICT WITH DUTY TO WARN.
The above factors present a strong argument for not invoking
a duty to warn third persons. Any type of a warning to a third
54. Slovenko, Psychiatry and a Second Look at the Medical Privilege, 6 WAYNE L. REV. 175, 188
(1960).
55. Stone, The Tarasoff Decisions: Suing Psychotherapists to Safeguard Society, 90 HARV. L. REV. 358,
368(1976).
56.
Unlike the patient suffering an organic illness, a person in psychotherapy, by and
large, visits his psychiatrist with the same secrecy that a man goes to a bawdy house.
The interests of the patient in nondisclosure becomes all the stronger when disclosure
involves a psychiatric label which often encourages society to believe that the patient's
behavior cannot be controlled.
Fleming& Maximnv. supra note 44 at 1050-5,.
57. Note, Psy'chotherapy' and Griswold: Is Confidentialit .4 Privilege or a R ght?. 3 CoNN. L. REV. 599,
604(1971).
58. Goldstein & Katz. Psychiatrist- Patient Privilege: The GAP Proposal and the Connecticut Statute, 36
CONN. B. J. 175, 179(1972).
59. R. SLOVENKO. PSYtCIATRY AND LAW 61 (1973).
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person represents a direct violation of confidentiality and imperils
effective treatment. The courts have recognized the importance of
confidentiality to the patient-psychotherapist relationship, but the
courts also believe that there are times when disclosure is necessary
to avert danger to others. 60 "While recognizing the physician's
duty of nondisclosure as the ground rule, courts have repeatedly
insisted that it must yield to supervening interests of society, and
that the patient's interest in confidentiality may be outweighed by a
need to safeguard the security of government or the safety of the
public. "61 The Code of Ethics for Physicians also recognizes that
there may be times when confidences must be revealed to protect
the public.
62
Thus, the confidential relationship between the therapist and
the patient will probably be severed when the safety of the public is
at stake. But, what if the therapist does not believe there is any
threat to the safety of the public? If the therapist does not think his
patient poses a threat to anyone, then there is no one to warn as far
as the therapist is concerned. Should the therapist be held
personally liable to third persons every time he makes an error of
judgment underestimating the violent nature of the patient?
Whether or not the therapist will be held liable for the error in
judgment depends on the standard of care by which the therapist is
measured.
VI. THE ELUSIVE STANDARD OF CARE AND ITS
EFFECT ON THE PRACTICE OF PSYCHOTHERAPY.
A. THE ELUSIVE STANDARD.
In the majority opinion of the Tarasoff case the court lightly
touched on the therapist's inability to predict future behavior, but
sidestepped the problem by stating that perfect performance by the
60
The therapist-patient relationship supports affirmative duties not only to the patient
but also for the benefit of third parties. A psychiatrist's loyalty to his patient and his
responsibility for treating the professional relationship with respect and honor does not
negate his responsibility to third persons, to the rest of the profession and to science...
• If a patient tells a doctor in confidence that he has brought a time bomb into the
hospital and hidden it under the bed of one of the patients, it would be a strange doctor
indeed who would feel that this professional confidence should not be violated.
Slovenko, Psychotherapy and Confidentiai'y, 24 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 375, 394 (1975).
61. Fleming & Maximov, supra note 44 at 1033. See Home v. Patton, 287 So. 2d 824, 830 (Ala.
1973); Berry v. Moench, 8 Utah 2d 191, 331 P.2d 814 (1958).
62.A physician may not reveal the confidences entrusted to him in the course of medical
attendance, or the deficiencies he may observe in the character of patients, unless he is
required to do so by law or unless it becomes necessary in order to protect the welfare
of the individual or of the community.
PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS § 9 (1957).
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therapist was not required. 6 What was required was the exercise of
the "reasonable degree of skill, knowledge, and care ordinarily
possessed and exercised by members of [that professional specialty]
under similar circumstances." 64 Within the broad range of
reasonable practice the court said the therapist was free to exercise
his own best judgment without liability. This traditional standard
of care for professionals does not provide adequate guidelines for
the therapist to follow. Under this objective standard the therapist
is measured against what a reasonable therapist would do in similar
circumstances. The problem is that even under similar
circumstances there is very little consensus among therapists as to
what steps should be taken. The chances of a second psychiatrist
agreeing with the diagnosis and treatment of the first psychiatrist
are barely better than fifty percent. 65 To provide adequate
guidelines the standard of care required must be readily
ascertainable. Such is not the case in psychotherapy because of the
widely diversified acceptable techniques.
B. EFFECT OF ELUSIVE STANDARD ON PATIENT.
A vaguely defined standard of care combined with the
therapists self-admitted inability to predict future conduct can
combine to adversely affect a mental patient. If the therapist learns
that he can be held liable to third persons for the patient's
unpredictable acts it is likely that the therapist will tend to
overcommit patients or warn third persons unnecessarily to protect
himself.
One can easily sympathize with the therapist's position.
Therapists are only sued by third persons after someone has been
seriously injured or killed by a patient. The therapist often only
sees the patient for a brief time in the office and during this time the
therapist must encourage the patient to discuss all his thoughts of
agression and violence in order to effectively treat the patient. Then
when these thoughts are revealed to him, the therapist must decide
if the patient could possibly perform violent acts. The therapist
knows that the numbers of patients who make threats are huge, but
63. Tarasoffv. Regents of Univ. of Cal, 17 Cal. 3d at 438, 551 P.2d at 345, 131 Cal. Rptr. at
25.
64. Id.
65. Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise. Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62
CAL. L. REV. 693, 701 (1974).
The lack of consensus of opinion as to what treatment should be used is a feature that sets
psychiatry apart from other professions. The fields of medicine, law, accounting, and others, have
greater consensus as to accepted techniques. This factor is often urged as a reason for the
inappropriateness of the traditional standard ofcare as applied to psychiatry. See supra note 52.
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only a few who receive treatment ever present a risk of violence.
The therapist is also aware that therapy often involves periods of
heightened instability when patients overemphasize violent
thoughts. 66 Still a therapist can never be absolutely certain that the
patient will not carry out his violent thoughts. The therapist knows
the court will view his actions after the fact with perfect hindsight
and it is easy for a third person to allege that the therapist should
have forseen and avoided the death or injury. Furthermore, expert
testimony is not much help in this area of the law because both sides
can easily find a number of experts who will support their view.
If the therapist is in doubt as to whether a patient could harm
third persons the potentially ruinous civil liability to third persons
for diagnosing wrong often will force the therapist to resolve any
doubt in favor of protecting himself.67 If the therapist decides to
protect himself in questionable cases he can either warn potential
victims or commit the patient. As stated above, overcommittment
and unnecessary disclosures are devastating to patients.
If the therapist decides to protect himself from civil liability to
third persons by warning them it is likely that this will impair
effective treatment for the patient. 68 The patient may become so
frustrated and embarrassed when his threats are revealed to third
persons that he may no longer cooperate with the therapist. The
patient may even violently react to the disclosure when he would
not have resorted to violence had there been no warning issued.
69
By issuing the warning the therapist may avoid liability to third
persons, but he may also open himself up for a suit for breach of
confidentiality by the patient.
The therapist may decide to protect himself by committing the
patient. This results in a total deprivation of liberty and involves
problems of privacy and due process. 70 Confinement can have
drastic effects on any patient. The social stigma of having been in a
mental hospital may stick with the patient for the rest of his life.
The saddest statistic about confinement is that it is often
unnecessary. It has been estimated that "as many as twenty
harmless persons are incarcerated for every one who will commit a
violent act. ''71
66. Note, Psychiatrist-Patient Privilege - A Need for the Retention of the Future Crime Exception, 52 IOWA
L. REV. 1170(1967).
67. Stone, The Tarasoff Decisions: Suing Psychotherapists to Safeguard Society, 90 HARV. L. REV. 358,
368(1976).
68. Id. at 370-71.
69. 17 Cal. 3d at 462, 551 P.2d at 361, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 41.
70. See, Fleming & Maximov, supra note 44 at 1046-56; Lockney, Constitutional Problems with Civil
Commitment ofthe Mentally Ill in North Dakota, 52 N.D:L. REv. 83 (1975).
71. Steaman & Cocozza, Stimulus/Response: We Can't Predict Who is Dangerous, 8 PSYCH. TODAY
32, 35(1975).
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Several courts have dealt with the problems of
overcommittment and have held that it is important for the
therapist not to be overcautious. Some patients will get better only
if they are released to return to their previous way of life.
Therapists must not be made reluctant to release those patients who
would benefit from release.7" In Eanes v. United States7" the court
recognized that taking a calculated risk by releasing a mental
patient is necessary to enable him to once again mix with society. 
7 4
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Imposing liability to third persons on therapists is a difficult
decision because there are as many valid reasons for imposing
liability as for not imposing liability.
The public has a right to be protected from mentally ill
patients who are dangerous. Innocent victims of violent acts should
be protected and many times therapists are the only ones with the
information and knowledge to forecast violent events.
Unsuspecting persons have no reason to take steps to protect
themselves and if the therapist knows of potential danger he should
take steps to protect these innocent persons.
On the other hand, imposing liability on the therapist to care
for third persons can drastically affect the rehabilitation of patients.
The therapist may start worrying about protecting himself rather
than what is best for the patient. Inability to predict the patient's
future coupled with potential liability to third persons may cause
the therapist to unnecessarily breach the confidential relationship
or to commit the patient. If committment becomes the rule rather
than the exception, many may not seek help who could benefit from
it and thus-public mental health in general would deteriorate.
Since the duty to third persons does have conflicting
considerations, what kind of a duty should be imposed? At one
extreme is an absolute duty to care for third persons. This would
have the effect of imposing strict liability on the therapist for failing
to predict the future acts of the patient. Such a duty would drive all
therapists out of business and provide little help to mental patients.
At the other extreme is no duty to third persons. This would let
therapists act in their own discretion, but would provide little help
to mental patients.
When determining the duty required of therapists it is
important to evaluate the service performed by therapists. If
72. St. George v. State. 308 N.Y. 681, 124 N.E.2d 320(1954).
73. 407 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1969).
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therapists are not effective in rehabilitating mentally ill patients
then perhaps the profession should not be protected from liability to
third persons. On the other hand, if a valid service is performed by
therapists then perhaps liability to third persons should be limited.
Assuming that the profession does perform a valid service, it
becomes apparent that an absolute duty to third persons is
inappropriate. The therapist must have some freedom from
liability so that he can concentrate on patient care. Absolute
protection from liability has its limitations too because there are
times when the public is in obvious danger and should be protected.
As usual the best approach is somewhere between the above
mentioned extremes.
A limited duty is probably desirable, but there is still the
problem of defining it. One author has suggested that a duty to
warn potential victims should arise under the following
circumstances: 
7 5
1) The attending psychotherapist and another
psychiatrist or psychologist have diagnosed the patient as a possible
danger to others because of his mental disorder;
2) The patient has made a specific threat against an
identified or easily identifiable person;
3) The patient has a present intent and capacity to
carry out the threat;
4) The intended victim is accessible to the therapist
and the patient.
The attempt to define the therapist's duty to third persons is a
welcome step, but this approach is not without problems. For
instance, when would the second opinion be required? The
therapist probably would not seek a second opinion unless he
suspected that the patient was dangerous. If the therapist does not
get a second opinion the injured third party will claim that the
therapist was negligent in not getting the second opinion. If the
therapist does get a second opinion the third person will argue that
the therapist would not have gotten a second opinion unless he had
suspected the patient was dangerous. Also it is not really clear that
a second opinion will provide more protection to the public or the
patient. This requirement may just provide the third party an
additional defendant to sue rather than providing better care for the
patient.
The second requirement is that the threat be against an
74. Eanes v. United States, 407 F.2d 823.824 (4th Cir. 1969).
75. Note, Tort Liability ofthe Psychotherapist, 8 U.S.F.L. REV. 405, 433 (1973).
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identified or easily identifiable person. This is a valid restriction of
the therapist's liability because a duty to warn the whole world is a
duty that the therapist cannot perform.
The third requirement is that the patient have a present intent
and capacity to carry out the threat. This is probably the ultimate
issue of any action brought by a third person against a therapist.
The third person will argue that the patient had the intent and
capacity to harm and that the therapist failed to act to prevent the
harm. The therapist will assert that he had no reason to take
protective steps because he did not think the patient had the intent
or capacity to harm. Whichever side is the most persuasive will
probably win the lawsuit.
The fourth circumstance where a duty to warn will arise is
when the intended victim is accessible to the therapist and the
patient. This is a valid factor because the therapist cannot be held
to a duty to warn if he can not possibly get in touch with the
potential victim and there is no danger if the patient cannot get to
the potential victim to harm him.
The limited duty approach could also be used for
committment purposes. The only difference would be that the duty
to commit could arise even if the threats were not directed toward a
specific person. A threat to the public safety could give rise to a
duty to commit. This approach would be subject to the same
limitations discussed in connection with the limited duty to warn.
As was mentioned above there are problems with the limited
duty approach. The factors listed which would give rise to a duty to
protect third persons are probably not the best factors or the only
factors which should be required. However, a perfected limited
duty approach would be a great improvement over the present
undefined standard of care.
If the limited duty approach was applied to the Tarasoff case
the outcome would likely be that the therapist would still be found
liable to Miss Tarasoff's parents. The patient made threats against
Miss Tarasoff, so the victim was identified. The therapist had
ordered the police to take the patient to a mental hospital,7 6 so it
appears that the therapist had decided that the patient had a
present intent and capacity to harm. The victim was easily
accessible to both the therapist and the patient. The only
requirement not met was the second opinion by another therapist.
Since the second opinion was not obtained it is pure speculation as
to whether or not the second therapist would have found the patient
76. 17 Cal. 3d at 432. 551 P.2d at 341. 131 Cal. Rptr. at 21.
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dangerous. It appears that the limited duty requirements were
present and the therapist would be liable for not protecting the
innocent third person.
If the limited duty approach was applied to the Merchants
National case the therapist probably would not have been held
liable. In this North Dakota case the patient had not made any
threats against his wife, at least not according to the court's
opinion. It did not appear that the patient had the present intent
and capacity to perform violent acts against his wife. The therapist
did note that the patient acted peculiarly, but no violent tendencies
were revealed. The victim did not appear to be accessible to the
patient since the patient was in Detroit Lakes, Minnesota, 77 which
is a considerable distance away. In this case no second opinion was
obtained. Under the limited duty approach the therapist probably
would not be liable to the deceased wife's estate.
The purpose of the limited duty approach is not to insulate
therapists from liability to third persons. The purpose is to protect
the rights of the public, the patient, and to let the therapist know
where he stands. If the court in Tarasoff had found the therapist
liable by following the limited duty approach it is unlikely that
therapists would have reacted with the same dissatisfaction.7" The
limited duty approach would show therapists when and why they
will be held liable to third persons.
At the present time therapists do not know what is required of
them. What the therapists do know is that the courts are expanding
his duty to third persons. The courts have an obligation to describe
under what circumstances the duty to third persons will arise. The
traditional standard of care is not enough. The limited duty
approach is a possible solution because it attempts to protect all of
the interests involved.
RANDALL K. HANSON
77. Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 272 F. Supp. at 411 (D.N.D. 1967).
78. Therapist dissatisfaction with the Tarasoff decision is obvious in at least two recent articles.
Ayres & Holbrook, Law, Psychotherapy and the Duty to Warn: A Tragic Trilogy?. 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 677
(1975); Stone, The Tarasoff Decisions: Suing Psychotherapists to Safeguard Society, 90 HARV. L. REv. 358
(1976).
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